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This draft – February 2009 
A wide range of public policies aims at improving the social welfare of the population 
or specific groups among the population. The use of the term social protection usually 
refers to the group of social policies that provide cash transfer to protect households from 
poverty. These policies are of two types. Social and health insurance policies are 
concerned about how to mitigate households’ lost of welfare in case of unexpected health 
expenditure or lost of labor income because of a member’s sickness, maternity leave, 
unemployment, disability, old-age or death. Social assistance policies intend to help poor 
households satisfy their basic needs and avoid deep or extreme poverty as a result. 
Following  S. Sumarto, A. Suryahadi, L. Pritchett (2000
2
 
) illustration, one can think that 
social protection policies are like ropes that help people reduce the welfare’s drop caused 
by the lost of income while social assistance policies are like rings that are thrown to the 
people so that they do not sink into poverty or extreme poverty. Social policies with 
different goals like for example: the social allowances paid to the meritorious persons, the 
subsidies on education fees granted to the poor students, preferential access to credit or 
the development of infrastructure in poor regions, do not belong to the sector of social 
protection.  
According to this definition, in Vietnam social assistance policies include programs 
that provide social allowances to the poor and the payment of emergency allowances in 
case of natural disaster.  
 
Since 2007, the government has indicated its willingness to develop and increase the 
impact of social allowances. The regulations have been changed in April 2007 and the 
budget in 2008 has been expanded to VND million 2100 from VND million 510 in 2007 
(or approximately from 0.05 % to 0.15% of GDP).  
 
                                                 
1 Comments and questions are welcomed at paulettecastel@gmail.com 
















































































































dThe goal of this study is to measure the possible impact of these new policies. 
Because the new regulations have been recently passed and few administrative data on 
the programs are available, the study cannot report on the effective impact of the new 
policy. The approach instead uses the 2006 VHLSS to estimate how efficient the new 
policy could be if it had enough resource to be fully implemented without any restriction.  
 
The first section measures how many of the poor could be eligible to social 
allowances if the decision 67 could be fully implemented. The second section describes 
the characteristics of the poor that would probably not benefit from this new policy.    
 
 
1.  New policy on social assistance allowances: Decision 67 
 
The Decision 67/2007/ND-CP of April 2007 introduced changes in the categories of 
the beneficiaries of social assistance allowances as well as in the level of the allowances.  
In summary, the new group of beneficiaries includes:  
 
•  the children who have nobody to rely on, children with AIDS/HIV living in poor 
households, 
•  the poor elderly who have nobody to rely on,  
•  the elderly who are 85 years and above and who are not pensioner or beneficiary 
from other special social monthly benefit  
•  the mentally or physically seriously disabled persons living in poor household 
(including AIDS/HIV persons),  
•  the poor people raising alone children, as well as,  
•  the families that have adopted a child and the families that include at least two 
disabled persons.  
 
One important change in comparison to the previous regulations is that the decision 
67 targets ‘the poor” instead of the persons that “have no source of income”. Some 
groups are also defined more broadly than before. The new regulation includes the 
elderly of 85 years and above while before it covered only those 90 years and above. All 
the households that include two or more seriously disabled persons are included whatever 




included. Finally, children whose parents are in prison are possibly also considered now 
as children who have nobody to rely on.  
The amount of the allowance has been increased from between 65 and 260 000 VND 
per month to between 120 and 480 000 VND per month.  
 
Finally one “emergency” payment is realized in case of unexpected economic 
difficulties after events like:  the death or the injury of a household member, hunger 
related to natural disaster or extreme poverty.    
 
                                                 
3 Toxic chemicals spread in Vietnam during the US – Vietnam war.   
All the beneficiaries are exempt from educational fees and benefit from free health 
insurance. Similar social allowances are also paid to the community-based social houses 
where some of the beneficiaries live.  
 
According to the administrative figures of MOLISA reported in Table 1, about 1.15 
million people could potentially be eligible to social allowance in 2008. In order to 
achieve a higher coverage that in the preceding years, the budget assigned to the 
distribution of social allowances is 3.5 times higher than the budget of 2007. 
 
Table 1 
Social Assistance administrative data 
Number of beneficiaries and budget 
  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
Potential and effective number of beneficiaries in thousand and corresponding 
coverage in percent  
potential   480.0  488.7  489.0  546.2  843.0  831.0  860.0  1100.0  1150.0 
effective   175.4  181.6  223.0  229.0  329.7  416.0  470.0  578.0   
coverage   36.5  37.2  45.6  41.9  39.1  50.1  54.7  52.5   
Budget 
VND 
billion  123.1  127.51  173.96  160.78  282.9  421.8  510.0  590.0  2100.0 
in % of 
GDP   0.03  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.04  0.05  0.05  0.05   
Source: Nguyen Hai Huu "Social assistance for the poor fact and measures" presentation made at the 
workshop on social protection policies for the poor Molisa - DFID Hanoi June 10, 2008.  
 
2.  Possible impact of Decision 67 on poverty:  the approach 
 
Measuring the impact of the implementation of the Decision 67 is right now 
impossible. The data on poverty and households characteristics included in the most 
recent VHLSS were collected in 2006 before the Decision was adopted. Instead on 
analyzing who did receive social allowances, this study investigates, therefore, who in the 
VHLSS 2006 would have been a potential beneficiary of the Decision 67 if the policy 
had been implemented in 2006. Besides measuring the program’s coverage of the poor, 
the study investigates also what could have been the impact of the Decision 67 on these 
household’s poverty status and gives indicators of the efficiency of the program to push 
people out of poverty.  
 
The potential beneficiaries  
 
This section describes the approach used to estimate the potential coverage of the 
Decision 67. The study calculates the share of the poor in the VHLSS 2006 that could 
have been recipients of social allowance if the Decision 67 had been implemented in 
2006 without any problems of targeting or funding.  
 Based on the criteria defined in the Decision 67, the group of the potential 
beneficiaries in the VHLSS is defined as including:  
•  All the children who live alone in households with not working-aged or elderly 
person  
•  All the elderly aged 85 and above who are not pensioners  
•  All the households that include at least 2 seriously disabled members 
•  The poor elderly (above standard retirement age) who do live alone or with other 
elderly persons.  
•  The poor household that include one seriously disabled member or with long-term 
sickness 
•  The poor households that include children and only one working-aged member or 
no working aged member  
 
Four criteria of poverty are used to define which households are poor: the GSO 
poor and extremely poor, the MOLISA poor and the registered poor. The numbers of 
GSO poor and extremely poor are computed according to the GSO poverty lines. These 
lines represent the cost of consumption baskets that include food and non-food items or 
only food items. The food spending is large enough to secure 2100 calories per day per 
person. A household is poor if its level of consumption per capita is lower than the 
combined food and non-food poverty line; it is extremely poor if its level of consumption 
per capita is lower than the food line. Instead of using consumption per capita, the 
number of MOLISA poor is obtained by comparing household per capita income to the 
official thresholds MOLISA uses in the field to define if an households is poor or not. 
MOLISA’s poverty income threshold was in 2006 equal to 200 000 VND per capita and 
per month in the rural areas and 260 000 VND per capita and per month in the urban 
areas. These limits are currently revised and could be increased to 300 and 390 thousand 
VND, respectively. The study uses, however, the thresholds used in 2006. The reason is 
that the use of the new thresholds would require estimate each households’ change in 
income in 2007 and 2008. This task is out of the scope of this study. Finally, the number 
of registered poor in 2006 is obtained directly from the answers reported in the VHLSS.   
 
Table 2 gives the number of poor households or individuals according to each criteria 
of poverty. The number of poor according to GSO methodology is about 2 times the 
number of the registered poor or the poor according to MOLISA criteria on reported 
income per capita.  Based on GSO poverty lines, in 2006, there were roughly13 million 
of poor in Vietnam of which 5.5 million lived in extreme poverty. Only about 7 millions 
persons, however, live in households that report income per capita lower than the 
MOLISA’s poverty thresholds. The number of registered poor of about 6 millions is 







 Table 2 
Poverty rates and number of poor and poor households 






















GSO Poor   2,637,468  13.4  13,047,757  15.8  14.8  16.8 
GSO Extremely 
poor    1,013,592  5.2  5,448,373  6.6  5.9  7.3 
MOLISA poor  1,388,157  7.1  6,772,450  8.2  7.5  8.9 
Registered poor    1,302,239  6.6  6,106,525  7.4  6.7  8.1 
Source: VHLSS2006 
 
Table 3 and 4 compares the distribution of MOLISA poor and the registered poor in 
GSO categories of poor, extremely poor and non poor. The results indicate that a very 
few of the MOLISA poor (1.8% see Table 3) and no one of the registered poor (see Table 
4) appear to be non poor according to GSO. As already observed in Table 2, the number 
of GSO is about 2 times the number of the registered poor or the number of the MOLISA 
poor. Therefore, at the opposite, 53.2 % of the poor GSO are not registered poor and, 
57.8% of the poor GSO report levels of income per capita higher than the MOLISA 
poverty thresholds. More surprisingly, 46.1% of the GSO extremely poor are not 
registered poor and 37.1% report income higher than the MOLISA poverty thresholds.  
 
Table 3 
The distribution of the poor and the non poor  
According to GSO and MOLISA criteria of poverty  
MOLISA 
 (income) 
Poverty - GSO  Extreme poverty - GSO 
Not poor  poor  Not extremely poor  Poor not extremely poor 
Not poor  98.2  57.8  95.7  37.1 
Poor  1.8  42.2  4.3  62.9 
total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Source: VHLSS2006 
Table 4 
The distribution of the poor and the non poor  
According to GSO and MOLISA criteria of poverty  
Registered 
 poor 
Poverty - GSO  Extreme poverty - GSO 
Not poor  poor  Not extremely poor  Poor not extremely poor 
Not poor  100.0  53.2  95.9  46.1 
Poor  0.0  46.8  4.1  53.9 
total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Source: VHLSS2006 
 
It is interesting to observe (Table 5) that although the total number of registered poor 
is close to the total number of MOLISA poor, the two groups do not cover the same 
persons: 47.7 % of the registered poor report income per capita higher than the MOLISA 
poverty threshold. This result suggests that procedures used by MOLISA and the local authorities to screen who are poor include additional criteria beside the revenue threshold 
or that local authorities face difficulties in measuring the level of income of the 
households.  
 
Finally, only 3.4% of the MOLISA poor are not registered poor. This result suggests 
that in the procedure of defining who is poor, the detection and coverage of the people 
with little income is rather well done.    
 
Table 5 
The distribution of the poor and the non poor  
according to MOLISA criteria of poverty  
and reported poverty registration  
MOLISA poor  Registered poor  
Not registered  Registered  
Not poor  96.6  47.7 
Poor   3.4  52.3 
total  100.0  100.0 
      Source: VHLSS2006 
 
3.  Potential coverage of the poor by the Decision 67 
 
Table 6 presents the results regarding the potential coverage of the poor of the 
VHLSS 2006 if the Decision 67 had been applied in that year without problems for 
identifying the poor.  
 
Depending on the criteria of poverty used, between 30.3 and 35% of the poor 
households could have been eligible for social allowances.  
 
Table 6 
Potential coverage of the poor by the Decision 67 
Indicator of poverty   Percent of poor households 
potentially eligible  
Percent of poor population 
potentially eligible 
GSO poor  29.3  25.7 
GSO extremely poor  30.3  25.0 
MOLISA income poor  27.8  24.1 
Registered poor  34.1  29.8 
Source: VHLS 2006  
 
The Decision 67 is not totally oriented to the support of the poor households, children 
who live on their own, elderly no pensioners aged 85 and above as well as households 
that include two or more seriously disabled persons are entitled to receive social 
allowances even if they are not classified as poor. As a result, as the figures in Table 7 
show, between 36.8% and 68.4% of the potential households recipients of social 
allowances under the Decision 67 are not poor.   
 
 
 Table 7 
Share of non poor recipients in the total potential beneficiaries of the Decision 67 
Indicator of poverty   Percent of  beneficiaries  
households not poor   
Percent of  beneficiaries   
not poor   
GSO poor  36.8  37.8 
MOLISA income poor  68.4  69.8 
Registered poor  63.6  66.3 
Source: VHLS 2006  
 
The figures presented in Table 6 indicate the levels of coverage of the poor the 
program could achieve if there was no problem of implementation. In the practice finding 
the poor and screening the poor from the non poor is difficult. Problems of finding the 
poor will result in lower coverage. Problems of screening will produce some leakage: 
non-poor who according the regulations are not eligible to social allowances could be 
among the beneficiaries.  
 
4.  Potential impact on households’ poverty status of the Decision 67 
 
Potential impact on households’ poverty status  
 
This section describes the approach used to estimate the potential impact on the 
poverty status of the VHLSS 2006 households of the receipt of social allowances 
according to the rules stipulated in the Decision 67. The study calculates how many 
recipients could have been “pushed out of poverty” thanks to the receipt of social 
allowances. The following methodology is used: 
 
The members of the household h are poor if the consumption per capita of the household 
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The provision of social allowance could help the members of this household satisfy their 












A precise evaluation of the possible welfare impact of the distribution of social 
allowances would require take into account that the increase of households’ total 
consumption can be lower than the amount of the received social allowance. The 
household can decide to save a portion of the allowance. Some members can decide to 
work less hours and thus finance lower level of consumption than in the absence of the 
transfer. Friends and relatives can decide to provide less support (gift, remittances, etc.).  
 Having these caveats in mind, this study measures how much poverty could be 
reduced if social allowances were totally used to support households’ consumption.  
 
Table 8 presents the results regarding the potential impact of the distribution of social 
allowance on the VHLSS poor households’ poverty status if the Decision 67 had been 
applied in that year.  
 
Thanks to social allowances receipts between 17.9% and 26.2% of the poor 
households could cover their basic needs and “escape poverty” if they use all the transfers 
to buy consumption goods. As a result, the overall population poverty rate could be 
reduced from 1.0 percentage point to 2.1 percentage point depending on if the program 
manages to target poor populations selected like the registered poor in 2006 or 
populations who are poor according to the GSO criteria of poverty.  
 
For about three quarter of the poor households social allowances would, however, not 
be enough to cover their poverty gaps. The poverty gap is the distance between poor 
households’ level of consumption or income per capita and the poverty line.  
 
Table 8 
Potential impact on poverty of the Decision 67 
Impact on the poor households  
Indicator of poverty   Percent of poor households 
receiving social allowance  
pushed out of poverty  
Percent of poor population 
receiving social allowance 
pushed out of poverty  
GSO poor
1/  17.9  13.2 
GSO extremely poor
1/  24.0  16.6 
MOLISA income poor
2/  26.2  19.2 
Registered poor
1/  19.1  13.9 
Impact on poverty rate  
  Initial poverty rate  Poverty rate after receipt 
GSO poor
1/  15.8  13.7 
GSO extremely poor
1/  6.6  5.5 
MOLISA income poor
2/  8.2  6.6 
Registered poor
1/  7.4  6.4 
Note: 1/ if social allowances are entirely used to buy consumption goods. 2/ social allowances are added to 
households income per capita and compared to MOLISA poverty thresholds 
 
5.  Potential efficiency of the overall program  
 
This section describes the approach used to evaluate the potential overall program’s 
efficiency in terms of poverty reduction.  
 
Table 9 first compares the amount of budget that would be distributed to the poor and 
to the non poor.  In 2006, if the Decision 67 had been  fully implemented without 
problems of targeting, screening and funding, the total budget of social allowances would 
have ranged between VND (of 2006) 1.9 and 2.8 billion depending on the poverty criteria used to target the poor populations. The efficiency of these funds to reduce poverty 
would have been limited by the fact that the program does not target only poor 
populations. As the figures in Table 9 show a large portion of the budget from 33.8 to 
60.7% could be distributed to non-poor.  
 
Table 9 















% to  the poor 
moving out of 
poverty 




% to  the 
non poor  
GSO poor  2028  2828  40.6  25.6  33.8 
GSO 
extremely 
poor  526  1878  30.6  8.7  60.7 
MOLISA 
income poor  77  2262  38.4  13.2  48.4 
Registered 
poor  1234  2199  28.9  21.1  50.0 
Source: VHLSS 2006 Note: 1/ Difference between the initial and after receipts poverty rates 
reported in Table 8 2/ Sum of the poverty gaps of the poor households recipients of social 
allowance  
 
A second source of inefficiency is that the amount of the social allowance in the 
Decision 67 is determined by category but not in relation to the recipients’ poverty gap. 
There are risks, consequently, that the amount of social allowance is too short to help the 
family escape poverty or too high regarding its uncovered basic needs. In the later case, 
part of the funds could have been used to help other poor households.   
 
Regarding the budget distributed to the poor, Table 10 shows that 39% of the poor 
households (GSO criteria) and 43.9% of the registered poor households would receive 
allowance too small in relation to the poverty gap they cannot manage to cover. At the 
opposite, 31.8% of the poor households (GSO criteria) and 27.3% of the registered poor 
would receive allowances two times higher than their poverty gap. 
 
This situation is due to the fact that the amount of allowances is determined 
independently of the situation of the recipients. An extremely poor household with two 
seriously disabled persons receive exactly the same amount of social allowance than a 






 Table 10  
Distribution of poor households  
depending on the share of the poverty gap is covered by social allowances  
 
GSO poor households  Registered poor households 
Number  
In percent 
of total  
Cumulative 
distribution  Number  
In percent 
of total  
Cumulative 
distribution 
Below 25%  23855  3.1  3.1  12011  2.7  2.7 
25% to less than 50%  98551  12.8  15.9  62164  14.0  16.7 
50% to less than 75%  81997  10.6  26.5  48730  11.0  27.7 
75% to less than 100%  96697  12.5  39.0  71985  16.2  43.9 
100% to less than 125%  55023  7.1  46.1  34892  7.9  51.8 
125% to less than 150%  80161  10.4  56.5  43658  9.8  61.6 
150% to less than 175%  58667  7.6  64.1  33085  7.5  69.0 
175% to less than 200%  31719  4.1  68.2  16200  3.7  72.7 
200% and above  245545  31.8  100.0  121241  27.3  100.0 
Total  772216  100.0    443968  100.0   
 
6.  Social allowances policies towards the extremely poor   
 
The previous sections show that if the Decision 67 had been implemented in 2006 
without any targeting and financing problems, social allowance would have had covered 
only a small portion of the poor and would have had rather little impact on poverty in that 
year. Even if the goal had been to reduce extreme poverty,  4.2 million of the registered 
poor, and an additional 1.9 million of persons extremely poor according to the GSO 
criteria (but not registered as poor) would not have fit into one of the groups defined in 
the Decision 67 and, consequently,  would have been excluded from social allowance 
receipts.   
 
This section, accordingly, investigates what changes or what new policies could be 
implemented in Vietnam so that social allowances policies play a significant role in the 
country’s strategy to eliminate extreme poverty.  In that analysis, the targeted groups are 
the registered poor and the GSO extremely poor (who are not registered) who are 
excluded from social allowances under Decision 67. The aggregation of these two groups 
makes sense because the process of the poor registration appears to be very efficient at 
avoiding errors of inclusion. According to the results of Table 4, above, only 4.1% of the 
registered poor are not included in the group of the GSO extremely poor. The latter 
enclose  the group of the registered poor.  
 
Table 12 
Extremely poor excluded from  
 social allowances under the  Decision 67 
Indicator of poverty   Number of poor households  Number of  poor persons  
Registered poor  858 271  4 288 712 
GSO extremely poor not 
registered poor   318 257  1 964 413  
Improving social allowance to reduce extreme poverty will, therefore, benefit the 
overall population in Vietnam. Expanding the coverage of social assistance allowances is 
not particularly related to problems of screening the extremely poor among the ethnic 
minorities groups. As the figures in Table 13 show, the households currently excluded 
from social allowances are as well Kinh and Chinese than from ethnic minorities: 66.8% 
and 78.2% of the extremely poor Kinh and Chinese and the extremely poor of ethnic 
minorities are excluded, respectively. The remark is still valid within each group of the 
registered group and of the GSO extremely poor who are registered. The extremely poor 
from ethnic minorities represent 54.1% of the excluded. 
 
Table 13 
Extremely poor excluded from  social allowances under the  Decision 67 
by ethnic groups 
 
Number of persons  Excluded 
share in 
category 
Distribution in total  
Excluded  
Potentially 
eligible   Total  Excluded   Eligible  
Total registered poor 
Kinh and 
Chinese  2 110 991  1 149 416  3 260 407  64.7  33.8  48.6 
Other ethnic 
groups  2 177 721  668 397  2 846 118  76.5  34.8  28.3 
GSO extremely poor not registered poor   
Kinh and 
Chinese  758 001  275 096  1 033 097  73.4  12.1  11.6 
Other ethnic 
groups  1 206 412  272 698  1 479 110  81.6  19.3  11.5 
Total registered poor and GSO extremely poor 
Kinh and 
Chinese  2 868 991  1 424 513  4 293 504  66.8  45.9  60.2 
Other ethnic 
groups  3 384 134  941 094  4 325 228  78.2  54.1  39.8 





Most of the eligibility criteria in the Decision 67 are related to the structure of the 
households and the presence of members who are not able to work. Households with 
seriously disabled persons are effectively more likely to be poor than the rest of the 
households (see companion paper).  More generally, individual income of the able bodies 
in poor households with large dependency ratio (that include very old persons or in which 
the household head raise children alone) are more likely not sufficient to help cover all 
the basic needs. The groups defined by the Decision 67 do not, however, include the 
families whose dependency ratio is high because they include many children or children 
and old people that are not very old (over age 65 but less than 85 years old).   
Resistance to provide social allowances to families with many children is often 
related to concerns that social assistance may reduce the direct costs of raising children 
and as a result encourage higher fertility (WB report, p. 39). In Vietnam such effect 
would work against the government’s policies that search to slow down the country’s 
demographic growth.   
 
Not supporting extremely poor children has, however, negative lasting consequences. 
Children living in extremely poor families are more likely to be working and among the 
poor children those working are much less likely to go to school (see Table 14).  
Children who are withdrawn early from school face a lifetime of lower earning (WB 
report p. 15). The PPA has collected evidence of these negative consequences. In the 
province of An Giang, the local officials not only observe that “many poor households 
have to stop their children’s education” but signal the negative long-term impacts on 
children’s physical and mental development as busy poor parent provide less care to their 
children. (PPA p.26). These children are more likely to continue to be poor during their 
life. As a result, the likelihood of poverty initially related to an unfavorable dependency 
ratio in the family is passed to the next generations that remain chronically poor even if 
they do not live in households with particularly unfavorable dependency ratio anymore. 
There are no easy solutions to solve the social problems related to child labor. Providing 
social allowances to the all the extremely poor families whatever their demographic 
structure is, however, likely part of the solutions.  
 
To avoid  that social allowances promote fertility, certain programs, like the Bolsa 
Familia in Brazil cap the social assistance benefits set according to the number of 
children in the family to three (WB p. 134) . In Vietnam such cap could be viewed as 
discriminatory against the ethnic minorities who have currently larger families. As the 
WB report suggests the implementation of programs that require women to get minimal 
preventive health care and health education and increase the opportunities to deliver 
messages about the health benefits of birth spacing might also help reduce the unwanted 
impact on fertility of social allowances.  
 
Table 14 
Rate of working children (age 6 to 14 years old)  
  Average  Confidence Interval 
       
Excluded with high 
dependency ratio over 0.5  6.2  5.5  7.0 
Excluded with low 
dependency ratio equal or 
under 0.5   7.8  6.2  9.4 
Total   6.7  5.9  7.4 
       
 
 
 Working poor  
 
Poverty is not only observed in the households with high dependency ratio. Table 15 
shows that among the extremely poor households excluded from social allowances under 
the Decision 67 48.1% have a dependency ratio equal or lower than 0.5. In these 
households, there is one or more than one working age adult per dependent.  In fact, 65.1 
percent of the extremely poor households excluded from social allowance include 2 
children or less.   
 
Table 15 
Number of children in the poor families 
 not eligibility to social allowances under the  Decision 67 
Registered poor and GSO extremely poor 
 






Potential beneficiaries   552 800  32.0  78.8 
Excluded with high 
dependency ratio over 0.5  344 599  19.9  13.6 
Excluded with low 
dependency ratio equal or 
under 0.5   831 929  48.1  86.5 
Total   1 729 327  100.0  69.5 
Excluded with 2 children or 
less  766 372    65.1 
 
This is true also among the households of ethnic minorities. The figures in Table16 
show that more than half of the poor households of ethnic minorities who are currently 
excluded from social allowances are families with 2 or less children. As expected, this 
share is higher in the Kinh and Chinese group (71.1%).  
 
These figures show also that for most of the poor households excluded from social 
allowances the causes of poverty are not directly related to particularly high dependency 
ratio: 70.5 of the poor households from ethnic minorities are households with low 




Number of children in the poor families 
 not eligibility to social allowances under the  Decision 67 






or less  Share in total 
Share with 2 
children or 
less   Ethnic minorities  Kinh and Chinese 
Excluded with high 
dependency ratio over 0.5  29.5  9.6  29.1  17.9 
Excluded with low 
dependency ratio equal or 
under 0.5   70.5  80.3  70.9  92.9 
Total   100.0  59.4  100.0  71.1 
 
Based on the observation collected in the PPA, Table 16 to 18 present some other 
factors related to extreme poverty that might be important to take into account in the 
design of social policies that aim at eliminating extreme poverty.  More exhaustive 
analysis can be found in the chapter of the poverty assessment that investigates the 
poverty profiles.  
 
Table 17 shows that the extremely poor households with low dependency ratio (the 
large majority of the extremely poor households not currently covered by social 
allowances according to Table 16) are in fact households with low income earners.  Each 
able working age member earns on average 4.047 million VND. Able working age 
members of the other group of the poor (the extremely poor with high dependency ratio, 
and the other GSO poor) earn significant higher levels.  
 
Table 17 
Average labor income per able working age households members 





Potential beneficiaries   5186  4843  5530 
Excluded with high dependency ratio over 0.5  5735  5352  6117 
Excluded with low dependency ratio equal or under 0.5   4037  3813  4261 
Other GSO poor   5979  5674  6283 
 
Table 18 indicates that this situation is not strongly related to the fact that the 
extremely poor families could not benefit from the recent economic growth. Only about 
one quarter of the households with high and low dependency ratio (currently excluded 
from social allowances) reports that living conditions have not improved since 2001.  
 
Table 18 
Share of households in which living conditions have not improved since 2001  





Potential beneficiaries   41.9  35.7  48.2 
Excluded with high dependency ratio over 0.5  23.8  16.6  31.1 
Excluded with low dependency ratio equal or under 0.5   25.2  20.8  29.6 
Other GSO poor   14.5  11.0  18.0 
 Table 19 shows that these households, however, have been borrowing in the past 
year. The share is of 40.8 and 33.7% in the case of the extremely poor excluded from the 
current social allowances.  
 
Table 19 
Share of households with borrowing  
Percent of the category 
  Average 
Survey 95% 
Confidence interval 
Potential beneficiaries   26.7  21.0  32.3 
Excluded with high dependency ratio over 0.5  40.8  33.1  48.6 
Excluded with low dependency ratio equal or under 0.5   33.7  32.5  42.9 
Other GSO poor   33.1  28.5  37.7 
 
Low income can be associated to particularly low returns but also to income shocks. 
Most of the poor have low education and few assets. It is not surprising that they obtain, 
consequently, low return from their work. However, the fact that the households with 
relatively small families report particularly low income suggests that a non negligible 
share of these families have suffered some income shocks in the past. The data does not 
make strong conclusion but the high share of households with borrowing points out to the 
same interpretation. As the PPA observes many poor and near poor households receive 
loans from private lenders for their production. Natural disaster and epidemics are the 
most serious risks for the poor. Harvest or livestock losses leave the poor during several 
years with outstanding debts with private lenders and at the Social Policy Bank. As a 
result poor households accumulate private debts over many seasons with accumulated 
interests which make them increasingly poorer (PPA section 4.1.2 and 4.1.3). Similar 
situation was described after the massive flood of 1998 in Bangladesh. No major food 
crisis occurred. “The flood did exact a heavy cost in terms of increased private debt 
because of extensive borrowing in private markets, a major coping strategy of the poor. 
Even when the worst outcomes are avoided, more subtle issues may arise, such as 
increased debt from which households may take a long time to recover” (WB, p.). 
 
Resistance to provide social allowances to extremely poor households of low income 
earner and/or that have suffered income shocks and consequently are largely indebted is 
often related to concerns that social assistance may reduce these households work effort.  
 
Another way to express these concerns is that social allowance risk to create “a 
culture of dependency and expectancy”. These concerns are explicitly reported by the 
PPA participants. Officials complain that State supports discourage the poor from ethic 
minorities to be active in their livelihood or to cope with natural and social changes and 
as a result they fail to generate willingness to escape poverty. The project beneficiaries 
are said to still maintain their attitude of reliance and that they do not want to work 
(section 4.1.4) 
 
The evidence supports the view that, in developing countries, safety net programs do 
not often reduce labor effort substantially. Academic studies show virtually no effects on 
the household’s primary earner and a limited effect on the work effort of secondary earners in low income households. In Mexico, adult earners benefiting from the 
conditional cash transfer PROGRESA worked as much as those in a randomized control 
group. In Brazil, simulations of the impact of the program Bolsa Familia on adult work 
effort found that the transfer amounts would have very little impact. In Armenia, the 
employment rate and hours worked by adults in the Family Poverty Benefits Program 
were similar to those for a matched sample of non participants. On the other hand, in Sri 
Lanka, a rice subsidy program seems to have induced labor disincentives (WB, p).  
Concerns that social allowances reduce beneficiaries’ work effort should not, therefore, 
stop the government in implementing new social policies toward all the extremely poor. 
Concerns bout the emergence of culture of dependency should not be, however, discarded 
and have to be taken into account in the design of the new policies. 
 
7.  One example of Family Poverty Benefits  
 
There is not a single policy design to support the extremely poor. The reasons that 
families are extremely poor are numerous and vary depending on the country and the 
period. The design must, moreover, take into account how much concerns about the 
impact of the new policies on fertility and work effort are important in the country.  
 
Consequently, general advises how to proceed can only remain rather vague. 
Extensive advises about all sort of settings are presented in the WB report. To help the 
reader get a precise idea, however, of the type of policy that can be developed, this note 
has opted to present one example: the Family Poverty Benefit program of Armenia. 
Armenia is a transition country that moved in 1999 from a social allowances system 
based on categorical groups like the one currently implemented in Vietnam to a most 
inclusive approach. Armenia’s targeting performance is also mentioned as excellent by 
international standards: it is as good as or better than the targeting achieved by the much-
praised conditional cash transfers in Latin America (SP paper). Because, through that 
process, all the documentation was made public, the example of Armenia gives a good 
opportunity to understand how new social policies can be developed and implemented to 
reduce extreme poverty.  
 
The following extracts are taken from the annex of the World Bank poverty 
assessment of Armenia, 200x. All the legal documents are presented in …  
 
The major component of the reform in Armenia was the consolidation of 26 small, 
uncoordinated categorical benefits in cash paid to individuals into a single monthly cash 
benefit that would be targeted at the most needy families (the family benefit).  Various 
targeting options were considered, including using a regression calculated from the 1996 
Household Budget Survey.  However, consumption correlates were not sufficiently 
strong and the Government decided to target the new family benefit using a somewhat 
adjusted proxy means-testing targeting mechanism developed for humanitarian assistance 
distribution.  The new system was introduced in 1999 but all the new regulations were 
approved in 2000.      The Regional Social Service Centers were given the responsibilities of implementing 
the policy. In order to create local dialogues about the way the policy was implemented, 
local Social Assistance Boards were also put in place with representatives (on a voluntary 
basis)  of social and employment services, heads of social insurance centers, local 
administrators, local officers dealing with adolescent’s problems as well as 
representatives from NGOs.    
Families who regard themselves as poor or extremely poor and seek state assistance 
submit, first, their applications and all the required documents to the Regional Social 
Service Center. Inspectors process the application and eventually visit the family in order 
to check the accuracy of the information. This set of information constitutes the family 
Social Passport on which the Center calculates a ranking score. Families that score within 
the eligible ranges can benefit from the state support for 12 months. In order to continue 
receiving the benefit, the household has to apply for the benefit again and go through the 
same eligibility testing procedure.  
The benefit administration is computerized, and the centralized data base is managed 
by the Ministry of Social Security.  The data base is linked to other data bases relevant 
for cross-checking of the economic and social situation of the applicant families 
(electricity consumption, telephone bills, customs records, the list of pensioners, etc.).  
The benefits are delivered to the beneficiaries through the post offices.   
The family score is obtained with the use of a proxy means testing formulas that 
includes the following variables:  
-  social category of each of the family members, or individual “social risk” 
(Pk) and related average “social risk” for the family (Pm);  
-  number of the family members not capable of working (Pc);  
-  place of residence (Pr);  
-  housing situation (Ph);  
-  car ownership (Pa);  
-  private business (Pb);  
-  the document issued by respective territorial center for social services 
verifying the social and economic situation of the applicant family (Pf) and 
its eligibility for the benefit (“eligible” and “not eligible”); 
-  family income (Pi). 
The particularity of the Armenian system is that whereas in other countries regression 
analysis or similar statistical techniques are used to determine the PMT scores (see 
example in Box 1), Armenia’s weights and point system was determined based on expert 
opinion of what would be the likely predictors of poverty
4
The score of the family need (P) is calculated using the following formula: 
.  
P =  Pm * Pc * Pr * Ph * Pa * Pb * Pf * Pi  
(a)  Socio-economic category of each of the family members (individual social risk)—Pk  and 
related average “social risk” for the family (Pm).   
Each family member is screened for a certain social category, e.g. for whether she/he belongs to a 
certain category of “social risk”.  Each category brings a certain number of points.  The number 
                                                 
4 This aspect was apparently driven by the fact that households with informal income can underreport 
income to become eligible reflects the assumed level of need of each category.  The list of categories and corresponding 
number of points is presented in the following table. These categories are similar to those 
considered in Vietnam under the decision 67. 
    Social category  Points 
1  Biological orphan (no parents)  50 
2  First category disabled  48 
3  Child invalid (up to 16)  45 
4  Biological orphan (one parent deceased)  43 
5  Second category disabled  39 
6  Pensioner (75+)  39 
7  Single pensioner  36 
8  Child below 2 year of age  35 
9  Pensioner  34 
10  Child 2-18  33 
11  Pregnant women (20+ weeks)  30 
12  Third category disabled (below pension age)  28 
13  Unemployed  27 
14  Single mother child  26 
15  Child of divorced parents  26 
16  Public university student  22 
17  No social category 20  20 
   
In cases where one person belongs to several social categories, a weighted average is calculated.  
The weights are as follows: for the category with the highest number of points 1.0; for the second 
highest 0.3 and for the third and all the rest 0.1.  For instance, a person can be a 17-year old child 
(category 10), with divorced parents (category 15), a student (category 16) and a third category 
disabled (category 12).  Her/his individual social category (or “social risk”) score is calculated in 
the following way: 
    Pk(ind) = P10 + 0.3*P12 + 0.1*(P15+P16) = 33+0.3*28+0.1(26+22) = 46.2 
The average “social risk” score for a family is calculated as arithmetic mean of the family 
members’ scores. 
(b) Number of family members not capable of working (Pc).  The value of this factor is calculated 
in the following way: Pc = 1.0 + 0.02*m, where m is the number of the family members incapable 
of working, namely children up to 16, women over 63, men over 65 and first and second category 
disabled.   
(c) Place of residence (Pr).  For most of the settlements in Armenia, the value of this factor is 
one.  However, there is a list of 173 settlements (in the earthquake zone and border territories) for 
which the coefficient ranges between 1.03 and 1.05.   
(d) Housing situation (Ph).   Housing situation is classified into 6 categories with the following 
coefficients: “domik” (temporary shelter such as a carriage, a barrack, etc., in particular in the 
earthquake zone) – 1.2; homeless – 1.07; unsafe dwelling – 1.05; collective center – 1.03; other – 
1.02; permanent dwelling – 1. 
(e) Filter variables (0 or 1).  The following factors are used as filters: a car ownership (Pa), 
private business (Pb), and a document issued by respective territorial center for social services 
verifying the social and economic situation of the applicant family and its eligibility for the 
benefit (Pf).  Their value can be either 1 or 0.  Obviously, 0 for any of the three (the family has a 
car and uses it, the family or its members are running private business and the social services center has assessed the family as ineligible for the benefit) eliminates the family from the list of 
beneficiaries.     
(f) Family income.  The family income coefficient is calculated using the following formula:  
      Pi = 1.2 – 0.04*(ΣSj/m*M)    (j=1...n) 
Where n is the number of the household members, sj is the income of the j-th household member, 
m is the number of the present household members, and M is the minimum wage (regulated by 
the Government).  The income includes wages and salaries, income from self-employment, 
pensions, stipends and unemployment compensation.  Income from farming is estimated based on 
cadastral income, while income from cattle breeding is estimated separately using a methodology 
regulated by the Government.  
The score that qualifies the household for the benefit is 36.01. It has remained unchanged since 
the family benefit was introduced.     
 
As it was mentioned already above, the Armenia’s targeting performance is 
mentioned as excellent by international standards. One advantage of the ranking score is 
that the system can differentiate the amount of aids according to it. For example in Georgia, 
families with very low score that are considered extremely poor receive monetary aid for 
subsistence while the others receive subsidized access to health insurance and electricity 
(xxx).  
 
Evaluation reports mention, however, that the policy does not reach all the poor 
families because many poor families do not apply. The reasons are not clear: maybe they 
do not understand well the process, or it seems too complicated; maybe the do not want 
to ask for the State support (xxx).  
 
Currently the screening process in Vietnam is very efficient: only a few registered 
poor are not extremely poor. Many extremely poor are excluded from registration, 
however. Some studies suggest that the main reason is that the lack of funding of social 
policy leads local authorities to reduce the list of the potential beneficiaries. It could be 
also that the current screening method has some limitations. Based on interviews 
conducted in 3 provinces at province, district and commune level, a GTZ mission (2008) 
signals that “potential beneficiaries (even those registered) display a general lack of 
information ….concerning [the] services and benefits delivered by social assistance … 
together with a low awareness of having actually a (claimable) right to receive social 
assistance and proper services” . Eliminating extreme poverty requires, therefore besides 
the systematic collection of information, the implementation of more resolute actions to 
reach and include all the extremely poor (public campaigns, systematic visits of social 
workers in potentially extremely poor households etc.).   
 
 
8.  Conclusion  
 
This study investigated the possible impact of the new social allowance policy 
designed in the Decision 67 of 2007. Because there are still no statistics collected about 
its implementation, the study uses the data collected in the VHLSS 2006 to measure how 
many people and families could benefit from such policy if its implementation did not 
encounter problems of screening or funding. It shows that a large share of the extremely 
poor would remain excluded.  
 
 
Box 1 The following table gives an example of the weights derived from poverty regression 
used in means testing procedures. (A. Posarac The system of Social Assistance based on proxy means 
testing, presentation in Sarajevo) 
 
  Coef  sd    Coef  Sd 
lhhsize  -0.562***  0.036  Cooking Oven  0.054***  0.020 
lhhsize2  -0.014  0.011  Cooking Stove  -0.001  0.019 
Share of children 0-6  -0.534***  0.037  Microwave Oven  0.067***  0.013 
Share of children 7-14  -0.520***  0.035  Dishwasher  -0.007  0.035 
Share of children 15-18  -0.121***  0.046  Vacuum Cleaner  0.060***  0.009 
Share of adult males (19-60)  (dropped)    TV Set  0.112***  0.029 
Share of adult females (19-60)  -0.166***  0.035  Satellite Receiver  0.042***  0.010 
Share of elderly  -0.144***  0.038  Video  0.045***  0.012 
Share of job holders  -0.010  0.030  Video Camera  0.067***  0.020 
Share of employed in public sectror  0.038***  0.012  Computer  0.063***  0.010 
Recieves any subsidy  -0.106***  0.017  Telephone  0.075***  0.009 
Characteristics of the head      Mobile Phone  0.128***  0.011 
Female headed hh  0.037**  0.015  Air Conditioner  0.099***  0.018 
Age of the head  0.001*  0.001  Solar Heater  0.008  0.012 
Education of the head      Private Car  0.210***  0.009 
Illiterate  (dropped)    Radio  0.005  0.008 
Read/Write  0.048***  0.017  Sewing Machine  0.004  0.011 
Primary  0.056***  0.016  Characteristics of dwelling 
Elementary  0.043***  0.016  Number of rooms  0.050***  0.005 
Basic  0.021  0.024  Villa  (dropped)   
Secondary  0.083***  0.018  House  0.008  0.041 
Intermidiate  0.088***  0.020  Flat  0.029  0.041 
University  0.156***  0.021  Dwelling area m2  0.001***  0.000 
Occupation of the head      Type of ownership     
hocc_1  -0.031  0.059  Own  0.040***  0.015 
hocc_2  0.101*  0.059  Rented  0.018  0.016 
hocc_3  0.007  0.057  For work  -0.096*  0.049 
hocc_4  0.026  0.058  Free  (dropped)   
hocc_5  -0.013  0.058  Source of heating     
hocc_6  0.038  0.056  Kerosine  0.056  0.054 
hocc_7  (dropped)    Gas  0.102*  0.055 
hocc_8  -0.005  0.056  Central  0.249***  0.057 
hocc_9  0.006  0.056  Electricity  0.169**  0.070 
hocc_10  -0.033  0.055  Wood or coal  0.039  0.058 
hind_1  0.030  0.040  Other  (dropped)   
hind_2  -0.010  0.060  No heating  0.005  0.065 
hind_3  0.033  0.058  Source of drinking water 
hind_4  0.068  0.067  Piped water  -0.237***  0.068 
hind_5  0.024  0.058  Well  -0.217***  0.070 
hind_6  -0.010  0.056  Water tank  -0.180**  0.071 
hind_7  0.051  0.057  Mineral/filtered water  -0.185***  0.069 
hind_8  0.027  0.057  Spring water  (dropped)   
hind_9  -0.011  0.057  Public sewage  0.017  0.011 
hind_10  -0.000  0.060  Construction material     
Household assets      Clean Stone  0.209***  0.065 
WASHING MACHINE  0.095***  0.024  Stone & concr  0.136**  0.064 
REFRIGERATOR  0.070***  0.024  Concreate  0.113*  0.064 
FREEZER  0.044***  0.014  Cement block  0.096  0.063 
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Annex on households with people with severe disability 
With the participation of Tam Tran Ngo Minh (VASS/CAF)  
Disabled people face many difficulties and deprivations that are far beyond economic 
problems and, the economic difficulties they face are multidimensional. Studying the 
situation of the disabled person and design policies to support them are very complex 
tasks. This note only investigates one aspect: household’s welfare.  
 
Several reasons justify that having a disabled person at home can reduce household’s 
welfare. First, some disabled persons have lower productivity than not disabled people so 
they earn lower income. Some cannot work at all. Second, some disabled persons need 
special care and spending. This reduces other household members’ consumption level 
and limits their possible dedication to work, study and other direct or indirect income 
opportunities. All disabled people do not such have negative impact on the households 
they live in. More likely, people with severe disability do. In order to alleviate this 
impact, the Decision 67 target poor people with severe disability who live in poor 
households.  
 
This notes looks at this issue and shows that among the households that are severely 
disabled those including children are much more likely to be poor than the others. 
Households that include a working age person with severe disability are also more likely 
to be poor. These results suggest that particular effort should be developed during the 
implementation of the Decision 67 to effectively cover these households and design 
specific interventions to support better these populations.  
 
A.  Data and definitions 
 
The analysis is based on the results of the VHLSS of 2006. The section muc3B 
reports people self-rating (little difficult or very difficult) upon 6 types of disability: seeing, hearing, concentrating & understanding, taking care of themselves, mobility, 
communicating with others. The study focus only on the people with severe disability 
that is the persons who have answered that at least 
 
one of these tasks was very difficult. 
According to these criteria, 1219 respondents of the VHLSS 2006 were with severe 
disability. 
The small number of the sample makes difficult analysis by sub-groups, the study, 
accordingly, searched to regroup the 6 types of disability into 3 groups: 
 
Group 3: includes all the persons who report that is very difficult to understand 
something new or, to understand what somebody else is talking or, to start 
and keep a conversation going 
Group 2:  includes all the persons who report that is very difficult without using tools 
to walk about 400 meters long or, to walk up 10 steps without stopping or, 
that report that they need somebody else to help in the everyday life.  
Group 1: includes the other severely disabled to whom it is very difficult to see even 
when wearing glasses or, to listen even with hearing aid or, to bow and bend 
the body or to stand on the knees or, to raise hands over the head or to use 
the fingers to button the shirt or, to put on socks or, to tie shoe laces or, to 
comb the hair, or to eat without aid. 
Group 0: includes all the persons who are not severely disabled and included in the 
above groups 
  
The groups were built based on the type of disability and the poverty rate among the 
disabled of each specific type when compared to the poverty rate of the population that is 
not with severe disability. Because the poverty rate is the highest among the people with 
disabilities of the group 3, all the people with such disability and other disabilities were 
included in the group 3. Similarly, because the poverty rate of the people with the 
disabilities of the group 2 are also very high in comparison to the people with other type 
of disabilities, all the persons with such types of disabilities and other types were 
included in the group 2.  
 
The survey reports also the reasons that caused the current disability. There are 12 
possible causes and several reasons can be reported for one kind of disability. The study 
selected only the first cause reported by the person. The causes are organized into 4 
groups:  
 
War and birth:  when the disability is a consequence of birth defect, war, agent orange 
or low education level (any person with no birth defect is able to realize the 
proposed tasks without any education)  
Accident:  when the disability is a consequence of road traffic accident, work injury 
or, natural disaster  
Illness: when the disability is a consequence of illness or behavior related to social 
evil, old-age (because most of the disabilities are related to developing 
illness), problems related to other disability, and other.  
 The cause is reported if the person is heavily disabled and the cause is cited as one of 
the first cause for one type of disability. This means that one person can be associated to 
several causes if these persons have several disabilities (even at a mild level included 
because the question is presented whatever the level of difficulty). In fact only this 
happens in the case of 2 observations; 41 persons do not report the cause.  
 
The survey, finally, reports the length of time the person has been having the disability.  
 
B.  Frequency and general characteristics  
 
According to the results of the VHLSS 2006 (and this methodology), there are 
currently in Vietnam about 2.6 million people severely disabled, that is 3.1% of the 
population. As the figure in Table 1 show most of them, 77.8%, are disabled as a result of 
illness or old-age; 17.4% are disabled as a consequence of the war and/or because of birth 




People with severe disability: Frequency and Reasons by type of disability  
  Frequency  Reason reported for the disability 
  Number of 
people  






Accident   Illness  Total 
Other population  79 885 013  96.9  -  -  -  - 
Severely disabled   2 595 840  3.1  17.4  4.8  77.8  100.0 
   Mentally    870 330  1.1  28.2  2.9  68.9  100.0 
   Walking and taking 
care  1 261 638  1.5  11.4  4.6  84.0  100.0 
   Others   463 872  0.6  14.0  8.8  77.2  100.0 
Total   82 480 853  100.0         
Source: VHLSS 2006 
 
The people with important problems that affect their concentration, understanding and 
communication with the other represent 1.1 % of the total population. The causes of these 
problems are more likely related to the war or birth defects that in the other cases. People 
with important mobility problems or that cannot take care of themselves represent 1.5% 
of the population.  
 
Table 2 shows the same results by age groups. Because health deteriorates with age the 
incidence of severe disability among the elderly is very high (15.4%). About 1.2 percent 




People with severe disability: Frequency and Reasons by age group 
  Frequency  Reason reported for the disability 




Children  242 738  1.2  25.7  0.8  73.6  100.0 
Working age   795 704  1.5  37.6  12.3  50.2  100.0 
 Elderly     1 557 398  15.4  5.7  1.6  92.7  100.0 
Total   2 595 840  3.1  17.4  4.8  77.8  100.0 
Source: VHLSS 2006  
 
The causes related to accidents are more important among the working age than in the 
other groups. There is a rather large share of children disabled because of illness.  
 
The graphs in Figure 1 compare the frequency of severe disability among men and 
women by age groups. The shapes of the curbs are similar for both sexes. Before the age 
of 50, the incidence of disability slowly increases with age then it accelerates, particularly 
after the age of 70. Among the elderly 70 and above, the frequency of disability appears 
to be higher among women than among men. Because women have longer longevity, this 
result probably reflects that contrary to the men, women at advanced ages survive more 
likely health shocks than men. Some of them, however, remain severly disabled.  
 
Figure 1 























Finally, about 73% of the population in Vietnam lives in rural areas. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that most of the severely disabled live in such areas. However, the incidence of 
severe disability among the working aged people is more important in rural areas: 1.6% 
of the working aged populations in rural areas are severely disabled against 1.2% in 
urban areas (the difference is statistically significant). One reason could be that people 
working in agriculture are particularly more exposed to work injury or disease than other 
people. Another reason could be that disabled people are less likely to migrate to urban 
areas.  
 
C.  Poverty rates  
 
About 12% of the households in Vietnam include one or several persons with severe 
disability. These households are statistically more likely to be poor than the rest of the population. As the figures reported in Table 4 show, 20.8% of the people living in 
household with one or several severely disabled persons are poor while the rate is 15.1% 
among the rest of the population. The measure of poverty is based on GSO evaluation of 
household expenditure per capita and estimate of the poverty line. 
 
Table 4 
Severe disability: poverty rates 
 











Lower bound  Upper bound 
Do not include  
severely disabled   17 324 857  88.3  15.1  14.1  16.2 
Include severely 
disabled persons  2 305 016  11.7  20.8  17.8  23.8 
Total population   19 629 872  100.0  15.8  14.8  16.8 
With severely 
disabled children   232 836  1.2  35.3  25.3  45.2 
With severely 
disabled working 
aged persons  821 378  4.2  23.4  18.1  28.6 
With severely 
disabled elderly   1 340 384  6.8  16.6  13.1  20.2 
Note: 1/ poverty rates are statistically different if the corresponding survey’s confidence intervals do not 
overlap.  Source: VHLSS 2006. 
 
There are about 1 million households that include children or working aged severely 
disabled. These households are significantly more likely to be poor than the rest of the 
population. The poverty rate of the households that include children severely disabled is 
particularly higher: 35.3 %.  By contrast the households that include severely disabled 
elderly are not particularly poor.  
 
 